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Summary:
Game theory is a formal to ol for analysing strategic interaction between a finite number of agents.
The fact that usually more than one entity or agent has property rights to fishery resources, has led to
an explosion in the use of game theory and applications thereof to analyse fishery management
problems. This review shows that game theoretic modelling has made significant contributions to
our understanding of the problems of fishery resource management. However, many challenges still
remain. For instance, models of straddling stocks are yet to be fully developed. In addition, fisheries
economists have not yet fully exploited the opportunity provided by computational methods now
available, and the ever increasing power of computers, to develop more empirical game theoretic
models for practical fisheries management.
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Introduction
Fish may be classified as destructible renewable stock resources, which portray two
characteristics.1 First, "utilisation" of a unit of fish implies its destruction, that is, the
unit is irrevocably lost. Second, the fish stock can be augmented to enable a continuing
availability through time. Thus, fish (as for other renewable natural resources), have
the special feature that even though their utilisation results in depletion, new stocks are
created by a process of self-generation. The regeneration occurs at a 'natural' rate, often
directly dependent upon the amount of original stock remaining unutilised. The
essence of fishery economics stems from the stock characteristic of fisheries and the
fact that the rate of biomass adjustment of a fish stock is a function of that stock2.
Essentially, the central problem of natural resource economics at large, and fisheries
economics in paricular, is intertemporal allocation. In other words, natural resource
economists, are mainly concerned with the question of how much of a stock should be
designated for consumption today and how much should be left in place for the future.
The solution to this central problem has been elusive for the following reasons. First,
renewable natural resources are often "common property" , in which several entities
have property rights to the resource. In paricular, certain fisheries are transboundar
and/or straddling in nature.3 Second, some species of fish are long lived, such that
whether juveniles or mature fÏsh are caught can have important biological and
economic consequences. Third, in multispecies systems, there is usually some form of
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natural interaction between species, which have both biological and economic
consequences. Fourth, different vessel types employed in the exploitation of the
resource have different effects on the health of the stock, and the economics of the
fishery. Fifth, capital embodied in the exploitation of natural resources are often non-
malleable, which can impact on management plans. Sixth, there is the problem of
uncertainly about the biology and economics of the resource. Seventh, we must deal
with the problem of market interaction in both factors and products. As demonstrated
in the sections that follow, the fisheries economics literature is rich in attempts to
address these problems.
Models of fishing
Open access and sole ownership fishery models
Economists have traced the main problem of the fishing industry to its unique
"common property" characteristics.4 The first comprehensive analysis of this problem
was by Gordon.5 The common property characteristics of the fishery is necessarily
associated with both open access and the lack of delineated right to the fishery.6
Earlier published analyses of fisheries economics 7,8,9,10,11,12 have been concerned with
two contras ting systems of property rights: (i) full rights and (ii) no rights. These two
systems yield unique "Nash non-cooperative outcomes,,13, namely the sole ownership
(social planner's) outcome for the former, and the open access outcome for the latter.
The open access or the "tragedy of the commons" outcome is easy to implement but
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most wastefuL. A solid theoretical discussion of this outcome is given in (9). The
social planner's outcome, by reducing play to a sole owner, is almost impossible to
realise in practice because of the constant threat of new entrants into the fishery. The
sole ownership equilibrium, however, has excellent efficiency properties. It is usually
us ed as a reference point for the analysis of real world situations.
Game theoretie models14
Game theory is a mathematical to ol for analysing strategic interaction. For example,
suppose a few firms dominate a market, or a few group of individuals or entities
have fishing rights to a common property resource, or countries have to make an
agreement on trade or environmental policy. Each agent in question has to consider
the other' s reactions and expectations regarding their own decisions.
With the development of game theory15 came its use to analyse problems not only in
economics but also in such diverse areas as political science, philosophy, and
military strategy. 16 Currently there is an explosion in the use of game theory and
applications thereof in virtually all areas of economics.
Game theoretic fisheries models are made up of a combination of a biological model
of fisheries and one of the solution concepts of Nash, or their refinements. The
biological models underlying such game theoretic models can be classified into two
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main categories 17. First, Models of the lumped parameter type, for which the models
of Ricker18 in discrete time, and of Schaefer19 in continuous time, are the most widely
used. Second, the so-called cohort models, which explicitly recognise that fish grow
with time and suffer natural mortality. The most commonly used model in this class is
that of Beverton and Holt20. (17) argues that both the age at which fish are captured
and the relationship between parent stock and recruitment play an important role in
determining yields in many commercially important fisheries. Therefore, it would
seem reasonable to consider optimal haresting using a model which incorporates both
a cohort structure and dependency of recruitment upon parent stock. One model with
both of these characteristics is the Leslie matrix model21.
Cooperative and non-cooperative management
Nash22 was the first to explicitly distinguish between cooperative and non-cooperative
gares. He classified gares in which binding agreements are not feasible to be non-
cooperative, and those in which binding agreements are feasible, cooperative games.
Both of these types of gares have been used to analyse the exploitation of fishery
resources. Usually, models are developed to study what happens both to the biology
and economics of a fishery under cooperation and non-cooperation, with the aim of
isolating the negative effects of non-cooperation23.
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In undertakng a cooperative management analysis, Munr024 combined the standard
economic model of a fishery with cooperative game theory. It is shown in this study
that if the cooperative management is unconstrained, that is, if allowances are made
for time variant harvest shares and for transfer payments, then to achieve optimal joint
hare st demands that the patient player should buy out its impatient parner entirely at
the commencement of the prograr and manage the resource as a single owners. Thus,
achieving what Munro calls an optimum optimorum26. Sumaila27 develops an applied
computational game theoretic model in which two vessel types are organized as
separate agents, who exploit a shared stock (the Arcto-Norwegian cod stock). The
results of this study confirms the main theoretical findings of (24).
The analysis of cooperative non-binding programs is more difficult (25). The key to
the solution of such progrars is for each player in the game to devise a set of "credible
threats,,28. Kaitala and Pohjola29 provide a good exarple of non-binding cooperative
management. In their model, the management program is modelled as a differential
game in which memory strategies are used. Vislie30 developed a simplified version of
(24), which he used to derive a self-enforcing sharing agreement for exploiting
transboundar renewable resources in cooperative without strictly Uudicially) binding
contracts.
Krawczyk and Tolwinski31 consider a feedback solution to an optimal control problem
with 9 control variables for the Southem Bluefin Tuna (SBT). Kennedy and
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Watkins32, instead, consider a cooperative solution for the SBT management problem
modelled as a 2-agent, optimal control problem with linear dynamics. Both papers use
multi-cohort biomodels to determine optimal time dependent quotas. To solve their
models both studies employ the perturbation method developed in Horwood and
Whittle33.
DynamIc externality
Dynamic externality is the bioeconomic loss which arises when a single dynamic
population is exploited by a finite number of fishers. (23) study this kind of externality
by using the concept of Cournot - N ash equilibria. Clark34 considered a limited access
fishery as an N-person, nonzero-sum differential gare. Sumaila35 uses computational
gare theoretic models of fishing that study the consequences of dynamic externality.
All these papers show that, no matter the details of the models developed, the negative
bioeconomic effects of dynamic externality are quite significant.
Market externality
Dockner et. al.36 presented a generalised Gordon-Schaefer fishery model to a duopoly.
The main difference between this model and "no-market" interaction models, such as
(34,35) is that it is an oligopolistic model rather than a competitive market output
one37. It assumes that the price of landed fish is not constant but depends on the
quantity harested by all producers, implying that the interaction at the marketplace,
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while not the only interaction between agents, is important. The paper studies the
impact of different oligopoly strategies, narely Nash and Stackelberg, on prices,
quantities and payoffs to the players. The authors set up a non-cooperative game which
they solve both analytically and numerically by using the equilibrium concepts of Nash
and Stackelberg. Their analysis shows that in both the Nash and Stackelberg cases, the
player with the smaller unit co st is able to choose higher catch rates than his opponent.
They also find that the game is Stackelberg dominant. This means that the payoffs to
both players are higher in the Stackelberg case than in the corresponding N ash case.
Another finding of theirs is that in the Stackelberg case any information disadvantage
in the sen se of Stackelberg followership can be eliminated by a more efficient
technology.
Multispecies interaction externality
Quirk and Smith38 and Anderson39 were among the first theoretical papers to appear
in the fisheries economics literature on ecologically interdependent fisheries. Both
study and compare the free access equilibria and the social optima in such systems.
They derive necessary conditions for optima and interpret these in general terms.
Hannesson40 extends the results of these two papers to address broader questions
such as, is there a price at which it is economically sensible to switch from
exploiting the prey to exploiting the predator in such systems?
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Fisher and Mirman41 and Flaaten and Armstrong42 are theoretical papers which
analyse interdependent renewable resources using game theoretic models. These
papers assume single cohort growth rules to derive general theoretical results. The
study of Sumaila43 is an empirical study of the Barents Sea fisheries, which
explicitly recognises that fish grow with time and that the age groups of fish are
important both biologically and economically. Another study of problems in strategic
context is Clemhout and W an 44.
Transboundary/migratory/straddling stock models
One can distinguish between three types of transboundary fishery resources. First,
fish stocks that migrate between the EEZ of two or more coastal states, which may
be considered transboundary resources "proper". Second, highly migratory stocks,
which in effect refers to tuna. Third, the so-called "straddling" fish stocks, that is,
those stocks that migrate between the EEZ of one or more coastal states and the high
seas45.
Analysis of the management of transboundar resources "proper" is treated in
Munr046, McRae and Munr047, Munr048, and (27). (42) and Flaaten49 are treatments of
transboundar fishery problems involving Norway and the former Soviet Union.
Recent contributions in the area of migratory fisheries are: Munr050; Arnason51 and
(41) It is demonstrated in (24), (34) and Levhari and Mirman52 that, whatever the
scenario we choose, the outcome to the fishing nations of non-cooperation is of
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unquestioned undesirability (25). This is because the outcome is simply Pareto
ineffcient, implying that the payoff to some of the players can be increased without
necessarily decreasing those of others.
The theory of transboundary fishery resources has been used in the context of different
user groups and/or vessel types exploiting a shared stock. (26) and (35) are examples
where studies of the exploitation of a shared stock are organised around the vessel
types employed in the exploitation of the resource.
Recent conflcts, such as those between Canada and the EU over stocks straddling
between Canada's EEZ and the high seas, have generated interest among fisheries
economists on the management of straddling fish stocks, with Kaitala and Munr053
leading research efforts. Their work has thus far shown that the non-cooperative theory
developed for the study of transboundar resources also applies to straddling stocks.
This is, however, not the case when it comes to cooperative theory. Here, the
cooperative theory of transboundary resources breaks down because of the so-called
"entry-exit" problem implied by the "Draft Agreement for the Implementation of the
Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December
1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks,,54.
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Malleable and non-malleable capital models
A number of papers have appeared in the fishery economics literature that focus, in
part, on the irreversibility of capital employed in the exploitation of fishery
resources. Examples include Clark et al.55, Clark & Kirkwood56, Dudley & Waugh57,
Charles58, and Charles & Munros9. Among these examples only (57) considers,
qualitatively, investment decisions in a fishery with more than a single agent. (35)
provides a quantitative analysis of a two-agent fishery where the irreversibility of
capital is the central assumption. The negative economic effects of irreversibility of
capital were shown to be significant.
Fisheries management models with uncertainty
Uncertainty is certainly an obstacle for sustainable fisheries management, the main
sources of which include; firstly, the dynamic nature of fish populations in the wild
and the variability and complexity of the marine ecosystems of which they are a
part, and secondly, the impact of fishing activity up on the resources, and the fact that
perfect monitoring and control of harvesting in marine capture fisheries wil forever
be problematic.
Uncertainty has been classified into two broad categories60. First degree uncertainty
consists of "random effects whose future frequency of occurrence can be determined
from past experience,,61. Hence, it is possible to construct objective probability
distributions to capture this class of uncertainty. Second degree uncertainty, usually
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terme d "true uncertainty", covers events that cannot be predicted, and for which
objective probability cannot be estimated (60). It is possible to reduce this class of
uncertainty through further research but to eliminate it completely is but adream:
There wil always exist an irreducible level of uncertainty.
To date most stochastic economic models of fisheries incorporate only first degree
uncertainty.62 Protected marine reserves (PMRs) have been advanced as a viable to ol
for dealing with second degree uncertainty. A key effort in this direction is the work
of Lauck et ai63. This paper has explicitly linked the mitigation of sec ond degree or
true uncertainty to the creation of PMRs. Many biological papers have promoted the
establishment of PMRs as a viable alternative where other forms of fisheries
management are impracticable or unsuccessfu164. It remains to be seen what
bioeconomic models of marine reserves wil demonstrate about the use of marine
reserves to hedge against uncertainty65.
Computational methods
The key to the empirical applications in fisheries economics of the theoretical
assertions of game theory is the development of computational techniques for
identifying the equilibrium solutions it predicts. Three types of equilibrium concepts
or informational assumptions are used in game theoretic models; open loop,
feedback, and closed loop. With open loop information in dynamic games, players
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cannot observe the state of the system after time = O. Even if they can, it may not be
possible for them to do anything about it. In other words, they can commit to their
controls only at the start of the game. Feedback and closed-loop are rules for
choosing controls as functions of the state (stock). The difference between the two
information structures is that with feedback controls, which are Markovian in
nature, players know only the current state (that is, the pay-off relevant actual
information), whereas closed-loop information includes the way in which the stock
has evolved so far in the gare66. Feedback and closed loop controls allow the player
more rationality and flexibility but due to the difficulty of computing these solutions,
there has been a tendency in the literature to resort to the use of open loop sol uti on
concepts67. There are other reasons for the continued used of the open loop
equilibrium concept in the literature. In the first place, more rationality and
flexibility does not necessarily mean that closed loop solutions are always better
than their open loop counterparts. In the discussion of rules, or open loop in our
context, versus discretion, or closed loop in the macroeconomics literature, rules are
shown to often produce more desirable outcomes than discretion68. Second, the open
loop solution concept can be used with a more complex information structure,
known as piecewise deterministic gamei9.
Many algorithms for the computation of economic equilibria have been presented in
the computational literature7o. Examples of methods for computing game theoretic
equilibrium solutions are the perturbation method of Horwood and Whittle 71 , the
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methods used to construet and estimate game theoretic models of oligopolistic
interaction (66), methods for computing cooperative equilibria in discounted
stochastic sequential games 72, and algorithms from nonsmooth convex optimisation,
in particular, subgradient projection and proximal-point procedures 73. The latter
class of algorithms are intuitive because they are "behavioristic", modeling out-of-
equilibrium behaviour as a "gradient" system driven by natural incentives.
Concluding Remarks
In terms of policy, this paper shows that results derived from game theoretic models
of fishing have produced insights that have been beneficial to the practical
management of the world' s fishery management. Such models have, by revealing
the negative consequences of non-cooperation, contributed in encouraging and
sustaining the joint management of tansboundary fishery resources in particular.
Typical examples are the mutually beneficial management of the Northeast Atlantic
cod stock by Russia and Norway, and the joint management of the Southem Bluefin
Tuna by Australia, Japan and New Zealand. This review has also shown that while
much has been achieved through the use of game theory in analysing fishery
management problems, more needs to be done. Models for the conservation and
management of high sea fisheries need to be fully developed, especially, with
respect to determining viable cooperative solution outcomes. In addition, great
opportunities are available for more empirical game theoretie modelling of fisheries
management problems, by combining the many solution procedures currently
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available in the computational and simulation literature with the ever increasing
power of computers to address important fishery management problems.
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